Speeches of the Chair and the Vice-Chair

Speeches of the Chair and the Vice-Chair

The energy transition: building resilience in an age of shocks

Published on 13th of November 2026

Speech by Olaf Sleijpen, Governor of the Central Bank of The Netherlands (De Nederlandsche Bank) and Chair of the NGFS

COP31 in Antalya, on 13 November 2026

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak to you today.

When I started thinking about this speech, I had a rather different idea. I thought I would spend my twenty minutes debunking some of the persistent myths about climate change and the economy. After all, there are so many false narratives out there that are used to deny the need for action on climate.

Like for example: ‘We cannot both transition to net zero and continue to grow.’ 

Well, the evidence increasingly tells us the opposite. The economic costs of the transition are small compared with the costs of unmitigated climate change. And the transition itself can be a source of growth. In 2023, for example, clean-energy investment accounted for nearly a third of GDP growth in the European Union, and around 10% globally.

Or take this one: ‘There’s not enough money to fund the energy transition.’ 

Again, I don't think that is the real problem. Global investment is at its highest level since the Global Financial Crisis. The problem is often not a shortage of capital. It is a shortage of credible, consistent, long-term climate policy that gives investors the confidence to put that capital to work.

And then there is one particularly close to home for me: ‘Climate change is not for central banks to address.’

Well, climate change affects output. It affects inflation. It affects asset values and credit risk. It affects banks, insurers and ultimately the stability of the financial system. A risk that affects all of those things is not somebody else's risk. It sits squarely within the responsibilities of central banks and supervisors.

Now, I could go on like this. I could quite happily spend the rest of my twenty minutes debunking climate myths. But that would be too easy. And perhaps, for this audience, slightly insulting. Because you know all this.

So instead, I want to focus on something else today. I want to talk with you about resilience.

We talk a lot about resilience these days. And with good reason. Because we live in an age of shocks. Climate shocks. Geopolitical shocks. Cyber shocks. Pandemics. Our economies need more shock absorbers to deal with an outside world that has become increasingly unpredictable.

As chair of the Network for Greening the Financial System, my focus today is on one particular source of shocks: climate change.

And something fundamental has changed here. Ten years ago, when economists talked about climate risks, we mostly talked in the future tense. Temperatures would rise. Extreme weather would become more common. Economic losses would increase.

Today, we need to change tense. Climate risk is increasingly a present-tense phenomenon.

Around the world extreme weather events have become more frequent and intense, and so have the economic and financial consequences. Heatwaves, floods, cyclones, droughts and wildfires are causing increasing economic fallout.

In Europe this summer, many countries and regions experienced scorching heat, water scarcity and wildfires on a scale not seen before. In many other countries and regions it has been much worse.

Private reinsurers estimate that direct global damage from weather-related events averaged 384 billion US dollars a year over the past five years. That is more than twice the level in the early 2000s. According to an NGFS study, the cost of extreme weather events included losses up to 57% of GDP and inflation increases up to 17 percentage points.

We see the shift from future to present tense also in the behavior of banks, insurers and corporates. They are increasingly shifting from assessing exposure to future climate risks to addressing current climate impacts.

In other words: climate change is no longer only a risk we need to prepare for. It is also a shock we already need to absorb. And that means resilience cannot wait.

So how do we build for this new world that we find ourselves living in?

Building resilience to climate shocks can be done in two different ways: by limiting global warming and by adapting our economies to the effects of climate change.

If global warming had already stopped, adaptation might be enough. We would still have an immense task ahead of us. Because the climate system responds with a lag. Some of the effects of past and current emissions will only be fully apparent in the second half of the century.

But unfortunately, global warming hasn’t stopped.

Scientific evidence shows that the remaining carbon budget consistent with limiting global warming to 1.5°C is exhausted. That means an overshoot of 1.5°C within the next decade is no longer a risk but a certainty. 

And 1.5°C is already worrisome. Recent NGFS short term scenarios gave us an indication of what the future could look like economically on an horizon of 3 to 5 years. Under an adverse scenario, regional climate disasters could produce GDP losses ranging from around 6% in parts of Asia to 12.5% in Africa. And this is not even in an overshooting world. Without timely and coordinated action, such shocks could lead to global spillovers by disrupting food systems, energy markets and supply chains, resulting in broader economic and financial instability.

If we only focus on adaptation, global warming and its effects will continue to intensify. And this may bring us to a point where adaptation is no longer possible.

That means building resilience through adaptation alone will not be enough. Rather, we should see adaptation as complementary to mitigation. To build resilience for the future, limiting further warming, by accelerating the energy transition, should be our primary focus. Because by accelerating the energy transition and slowing climate change, we will significantly limit both the impact on the planet and the risks to our economies.

Now, there is another economic argument for doing this that I believe deserves much more attention.

Because there are two vulnerabilities here. One comes from what fossil fuels do when we burn them: producing greenhouse gases and warming the planet. But before we can burn them, we have to buy them.

And that makes economies dependent on volatile international fossil-energy markets, on particular producers, on transport routes and on geopolitics. That is something I think we can all relate to these days.

Recent volatility in energy markets and energy supply-chain disruptions related to geopolitical tensions have weighed significantly on the global economy. Energy prices will likely surge by at least 30% on average this year. 

Shocks to the price of fossil fuels affect economies through multiple channels: they raise inflation and production costs, weaken purchasing power and economic activity, and can put significant pressure on public finances.

As a central banker, I am particularly concerned about inflation. A temporary 25% increase in carbon-intensive energy prices could raise inflation by 2 percentage points on average in the short run, with larger effects in carbon-intensive economies.

Reducing the dependence on fossil energy will make importing economies less vulnerable to energy price volatility and to disruptions in the supply of energy.

As economies progress in the transition and the composition of energy supply and demand shifts from fossil to renewable energy, the exposure to fossil fuel price volatility declines for energy-importing economies.

A cleaner, more electrified energy system, powered increasingly by renewables, reduces emissions. But it also reduces an economy's exposure to volatile global fossil-fuel markets. That makes renewable energy more than an instrument of climate policy. It makes it an instrument of economic resilience. Or, to use the language I started with: a shock absorber.

We have already seen this in practice. According to the International Renewable Energy Agency, renewables helped avoid an estimated 480 billion US dollars in fossil fuel costs in 2025. When the Strait of Hormuz closed in early 2026, the existing renewable fleet provided a vital buffer.

That is a different way of looking at the energy transition. And I think it is an important one. Because it brings the two parts of the resilience story together. We need to make our economies more resilient to climate change. And we need to make them more resilient to fossil-energy shocks. Both point in the same direction: reducing our dependency on fossil fuels and accelerating the energy transition.

And let me be clear about what I mean by the energy transition. I mean reducing fossil-fuel use to a level consistent with net-zero greenhouse gas emissions.

I want to be clear about this, because although limiting global warming and reducing vulnerability to energy price shocks point in the same direction when it comes to policies, they do not necessarily point to same preferable end state.

Some see the energy transition as a diversification policy: ‘let’s settle for a more diversified energy mix and we’ll be fine’. While that may be sufficient to reduce the vulnerability to volatile energy prices, it is definitely not sufficient to limit climate change. The only way to limit global warming to a level that is already bad but still manageable is going to net zero.

And let me quote from the latest UNEP Emissions gap report what that means. If we want to limit the global warming to 1.8°C by mid-century – and this is the lowest possible 1.5 overshoot scenario – we will have to cut global emissions by 18% by 2030, and 45% by 2035, alongside increasing CO2 removal throughout the century.

So net zero is our destination. That is the task we have set ourselves. That is the mission. And that’s why all the countries assembled here in Antalya should implement their Nationally Determined Contributions. 

The energy transition is not easy. It requires an effort that affects the whole of the economy. It requires a lot of coordination. And it requires long-term planning and long-term policy commitment by governments. Because households and companies and banks and other stakeholders need a stable outlook. They need to know what the rules are to make long-term investment plans. Not only now but in 5 year’s and in 10 year’s time.

This is all the more important as we need the private sector to step in. Because the energy transition involves cost. Let’s not pretend otherwise. A cost that governments cannot bear alone. The fiscal position of many governments is already under strain. 

To make the transition business case more attractive, we not only need transparent and credible long-term policies, including emission pricing. We also need targeted, temporary subsidies for households and firms that are most affected by the transition.

We should also acknowledge that an increased use of renewable energy introduces new dependencies. Think about the demand for batteries, and the commodities that are used to produce them. This probably requires diversification between different sources of renewable energy. But also, and this is particularly true for the European Union, more integration of national energy markets.


There is no time to lose. The sooner we act, the more gradual and orderly the transition will be. Starting early gives economies time. Time to invest, time to innovate, time to build infrastructure, and time for capital to move gradually rather than abruptly. This can limit the cost of the transition, even in the short term. This applies both to fossil energy-importing countries and to countries that are dependent on its exports. Countries that may face substantial transition risks as global demand for their products declines.

Our NGFS short term scenarios illustrate the difference between action and ‘no action’. Early and globally coordinated climate action could roughly halve the economic cost of the transition by 2030: around 0.5% of global GDP, compared with 1.3% in the case of a three-year delay.

And let’s not forget that the transition can also bring immediate economic benefits, by supporting investment and lowering energy costs. Clean energy investment has become an important source of economic activity. As I said, in 2023, clean energy accounted for almost one-third of economic growth in the EU. Renewables can lower energy costs and thereby support competitiveness. Again taking an example from the EU: during the first four months of 2026, renewables are estimated to have saved almost €30 billion in wholesale electricity costs. So the transition is not only an investment cost. It can support economic growth and competitiveness right now.

So that is the good news. Of course, as an economist, I can give you the same message in a more depressing form: we can choose to reduce our vulnerabilities deliberately, or wait until shocks force the adjustment upon us. Or put otherwise: the question is not whether our energy system will change. It will. The question is whether we manage that change, or whether events manage it for us.

An orderly transition gives households, companies, banks and markets time to adjust. A delayed transition makes the adjustment more abrupt, more expensive and more disruptive. And for central banks and supervisors it makes a huge difference too.

 I realise, of course, that what a central banker calls ‘the short term’ may occasionally feel like the distant future to a politician. But the economic case for acting now is becoming harder to ignore.

So my simple message is: be bold, be consistent, start now. Because the transition is not only about protecting the climate of tomorrow. It is also about strengthening the resilience of our economies today.

Thank you.
 

Updated on the 17th of November 2026